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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000436

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PINS](#) [IR](#) [SA](#) [IZ](#)  
SUBJECT: AL-HAKIM AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS BADR DETAINEES,  
REGIONAL TRIP

REF: A. BAGHDAD 212  
[B](#). BAGHDAD 38 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#). (S) Summary: Abdulaziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), questioned the Ambassador on February 1 about several Badr members detained by the coalition. Badr leader Hadi al-Amri, also present, repeated his usual call for "evidence." The Ambassador told them that it appeared that some Badr elements were not following al-Hakim's guidance by participating in networks that smuggled weapons and EFPs into Iraq for use in attacks against coalition forces. The Ambassador previewed the heightened level of concern on Iraq in Sunni Arab countries that al-Hakim would encounter on his upcoming visit to the UAE and Bahrain. Al-Hakim lamented the sensationalism of the Arab media in their coverage of Iraq and condemned recent statements made by Sunni leader Adnan al-Dulaimi in Brussels. He called for "practical cooperation" between Kurdish, Shi'a, and Sunni leaders even in the absence of a formal moderate front. End summary.

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Badr Detainees: Concerns on Both Sides  
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[2](#). (S) Al-Hakim opened by asking about the status of various Badr detainees, including three detained December 21 at SCIRI headquarters (ref B) and two detained January 16 in al-Kut (ref A). (Note: Four of the seven Badr members detained December 21 were released on January 28. End note.) Al-Amri launched into his usual refrain, noting that Badr members were under orders not to attack the coalition, calling for evidence so that he could be the first to bring any guilty Badr member to justice, defending the map found on December 21 as a tool in developing popular committees, and characterizing Qassim al-Araji, one of those detained January 16, as "excited" about the good relationship he had developed with U.S. officials on PRT Wasit before his detention. Asked by the Ambassador about the receipts showing transfer of RPG launchers and sniper rifles, al-Hakim said Badr members did have RPG launchers and al-Amri asked to see the receipts. Saying that it was an "injustice" to continue to hold the remaining three from December 21 without justification, Al-Hakim said that the coalition should ask him and al-Amri, rather than those three, about Badr's weapons.

[3](#). (S) The Ambassador noted that questioning of the remaining three from December 21 continues and suggested that the DCM and MNF Deputy Commanding General Lamb would seek another meeting with al-Amri to continue their conversation about Badr's activities. He explained that the coalition had developed information that the two detained January 11 were involved in EFP facilitation, offering to ask General Casey to discuss this information directly with al-Hakim. He told

al-Amri that General Casey believed al-Amri had not "leveled" with him on certain issues. It appeared, the Ambassador continued, that there were elements in Badr who were engaged in activities contrary to al-Hakim's guidance, such as working with the Quds Force to smuggle weapons and EFPs in from Iran for use in attacks against the coalition in Iraq. Al-Amri agreed that Badr did have previous ties to Iran but asked for evidence that Badr members were involved in attacks against the coalition. He argued that al-Hakim could not visit the US and seek a strong relationship while at the same time "conspiring against you." The Ambassador replied that the US would not be seeking a strong relationship with al-Hakim if there was any thought he personally was involved; rather, it appeared that there were elements in Badr operating contrary to his guidance.

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Sunni Arab Concerns: Previewing Hakim's Gulf Trip  
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14. (S) Turning to al-Hakim's upcoming trip to Tehran, the UAE, and Bahrain, the Ambassador said that al-Hakim would find a "negative atmosphere" on Iraq in the Arab countries. Their concerns, he said, centered on the belief that the GOI was not protecting the rights of the Sunni minority, that many Sunnis had been displaced from their homes, that there was a program to make Baghdad a Shi'a city, that Saddam's execution was carried out as an act of sectarian revenge by the Dawa party, and that some Shiite leaders are too close to Iran. The Ambassador stressed the importance of dialogue between the Shi'a leaders of Iraq and their Sunni counterparts in the Arab world, and offered to try to facilitate an invitation to al-Hakim from Saudi leaders. The Ambassador said that Hakim visits to Iran make it hard to

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convince Arab states to welcome him. Describing the positive reception given him by Sunnis during his 9 Muharram speech in a mixed neighborhood of Baghdad, al-Hakim lamented that the Arab media never mentioned the positive side of developments in Iraq. He condemned Sunni leader Adnan Dulaimi for his "harsh and extremist" speeches outside of Iraq. The Shi'a, al-Hakim argued, had nothing against the Sunnis. The Shi'a, Sunnis, and Kurds, he noted, had agreed on a 30-point plan and had evenly split the key leadership positions in the government despite the majority status of the Shi'a.

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Opportunities for Shared Decision Making  
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15. (S) The Ambassador urged al-Hakim to play a leadership role in bringing Sunni and Kurdish leaders into the decision-making process and asked about the status of the moderate front. Al-Hakim replied that the idea was not dead but needed work and the "belief" of other parties, specifically IIP and the Dawa party. Even if the front did not become official, al-Hakim continued, "there should be practical cooperation." Al-Amri noted the importance of the security and economic components of the Baghdad security plan and said that Sunnis, Shi'a, and Kurds would share in the decision-making in these areas.  
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